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In the multidisciplinary field of Network Science, optimization of procedures for efficiently breaking
complex networks is attracting much attention from practical points of view. In this contribution we
present a module-based method to efficiently break complex networks. The procedure first identifies
the communities in which the network can be represented, then it deletes the nodes (edges) that
connect different modules by its order in the betweenness centrality ranking list. We illustrate
the method by applying it to various well known examples of social, infrastructure, and biological
networks. We show that the proposed method always outperforms vertex (edge) attacks which are
based on the ranking of node (edge) degree or centrality, with a huge gain in efficiency for some
examples. Remarkably, for the US power grid, the present method breaks the original network of
4941 nodes to many fragments smaller than 197 nodes (4% of the original size) by removing mere 164
nodes (≈ 3%) identified by the procedure. By comparison, any degree or centrality based procedure,
deleting the same amount of nodes, removes only 22% of the original network, i.e. more than 3800
nodes continue to be connected after that.
PACS numbers: 64.60.aq, 89.75.Fb
I. INTRODUCTION
Network theory and its applications pervade many dif-
ferent scientific fields, from physics to sociology, engineer-
ing, epidemiology, mathematics and economy —to cite a
few. In the context of network science, three important
concepts have received much attention recently: interde-
pendent graphs [1, 2], communities (or modules) [3], and
robustness of networks facing targeted attacks [4]. In the
present work we address and bring together these last
two concepts.
The robustness of networks against failures, targeted
attacks to individuals components, and the impact on
the performance of the system has become an important
issue for practical reasons in the last few years. In this
sense, the robustness of a network is often related to the
structural functionality of the system as a whole, so in-
formation can propagate over the network for example.
For instance, the failure of routers in the Internet [5],
the vaccination of individuals to prevent the spread of
a disease [6], and fighting organized crime or terrorist
groups [7] can all be described by a formal model in
which a certain number of vertices (edges) in the net-
work are removed [8]. Therefore, the robustness of a
complex network is directly related to the fraction of
nodes (edges) needed to be removed so that the network
loses its functionality. Conversely, the less the number of
nodes that a method identifies to break down a network,
the more efficient it is. In this sense, many centrality
indexes have been proposed aimed to measure the struc-
tural importance of nodes (edges) [8]. For instance, the
concept of bridging nodes in the topology of complex net-
works has been brought to discussion too [10]. Hwang et
al. [11] define a bridging centrality in order to charac-
terize the location of nodes among high degree nodes.
The method succeeds in identifying functional modules
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FIG. 1. Module based attack scheme: (A) represents the
original network, (B) is one possible module representation of
A, and (C) shows the internal structure of nodes and edges
inside two selected modules and the edges connecting nodes
between them; those edges (nodes) are the ones to be selected
for deletion. The graph depicted in A corresponds the US
power grid [9].
but does not show significantly better results than sim-
ple betweenness attack when it comes to atomize different
complex networks. Nevertheless, recent developments in
efficient community extraction algorithms from complex
graphs [12, 13] show a promising pathway in devising bet-
ter attack strategies. In effect, communities or modules
are topological partitions of graphs with dense internal
connections but weakly connected among them. In this
sense, in Fig. 1 we depict the community structure for the
Western United States Power Grid, illustrating this weak
connection among clusters internally dense. Henceforth,
a natural question arises: How structurally important
are those weak interactions bridging distinct communi-
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2ties and how are they related to the robustness problem?
To answer this query is precisely the main objective of
this study. The work is organized as follows: section II
discuss the generalities of attack in networks and the con-
cept of robustness, section III describes our method to
perform the attacks, while in section IV we present the
results of the procedure to ten examples of real networks
with conclusions summarized in section V.
II. ATTACKS
In order to quantify the effect of the attacks on the
networks [14], we define G as an initial network of size
N , and Gρ as the network that results after the removal
of a fraction ρ of vertices (edges). Then we denote by Lρ
the largest component of Gρ, whose size we denote by NL.
We define the order parameter σ(ρ)=NLN which allows us
to quantify the response of a network as a function of the
fraction of nodes (edges) deleted.
An hypothetical way of getting the ordered list of tar-
geted nodes to be removed would be by brute force: try
all the possible lists until find the one that reduce the net-
work to a desired size with the minimum number of remo-
tions. However this is useless because it means checking
N ! possible lists, which is computational prohibited for
any network bigger than N ≈ 12. On the other hand,
the simplest but no efficient strategy is random deletion
of nodes, i.e. make a random list of the nodes and re-
move them in that order. This generally gives rise to a
linear degradation of the network in which the fraction
removed is mostly not much than the nodes removed.
A more efficient and doable way of attack a graph con-
sists in the deletion of vertices (edges) in order of their
importance in the structural functioning of the network.
In this sense, traditional attacks focus on sorting nodes
(edges) in decreasing order of some centrality index —
the so called Centrality-Based Attack (CBA)—, which
perform much better than random attacks. Betweenness
centrality, for instance, takes a time, depending on the
algorithm used, of only O(N×E), where E stands for the
number of edges in the network. This way, if we choose
some method as a null reference, the gain in efficiency
can be computed by the normalized ratio
Γ(ρ) = 1− σ(ρ)/σ(ρ)nul (1)
which increases as the attack method becomes more effi-
cient than the reference one.
Even though most attack methods focus on centrality
ranking, real networks tend to group into sparsely con-
nected clusters and the removal of few bridging struc-
tures should be able to detach large chunks of densely
connected nodes, leading to large values of Γ(ρ), as we
shall see in the next section.
FIG. 2. Fraction of edges bridging communities vs modularity
Q for the ten real networks studied in this work. The dash
line is the resulting linear fitting: y = 0.7 − 0.8x, with a
correlation coefficient R = −0.95.
III. MODULE-BASED ATTACK
The structural importance of a node (edge) depends
both on local and non-local measures. Hence, in the
scope of the method proposed in this paper, centrality
and community detection are the topics that we address
to characterize and sort nodes (edges) in order to develop
the attack on networks. As pointed out in the works by
Iyer et al. [8] and Holme et al. [15] nodes with high be-
tweenness and high degree are usually strongly correlated
and both attacks have similar efficiency. Besides, previ-
ous work shows that for real networks the betweenness-
based method is in general the most efficient [8]. Thence,
from now on we take betweenness centrality attack as our
reference or null method.
Likewise, vertices connecting different communities
generally have high betweenness centrality since many
shortest paths pass through them. However, as fewer
connections are expected among communities these
nodes are not the ones with higher degree. Therefore,
in order to detach communities in a very efficient way,
we propose a Module-Based Attack (MBA) consisting of
sorting all nodes (edges) by betweenness centrality, then
choosing only those nodes (edges) that link different com-
munities. One should note that in vertex attack, as we
aim to detach previously detected communities, once a
node from a bridging edge is deleted, there is no need
to detach its counterpart unless it also participates in
other inter-communities connections. Besides, at each
step of the procedure, the attack will focus on the re-
maining largest connected component of the network, in
order to speed up the fragmentation. This process loosely
resembles the original idea of weak ties proposed by Gra-
novetter [16] for social networks and later developed in
the framework of topological communities by De Meo,
Ferrara et al. [17].
3〈Q〉 〈k〉 〈k2〉 N E N¯mod Nmaxmod Einter ηE ηN
Facebook 0.80 2.06 528 2888 2981 8 0.260 0.012 0.49 0.12
Twitter 0.85 2.81 108 23370 32831 136 0.056 0.075 0.84 0.36
Google Plus 0.68 3.32 1250 23628 39194 33 0.144 0.173 0.65 0.47
US Power Grid 0.81 2.67 10 4941 6594 40 0.040 0.034 0.86 0.77
Euro Road 0.77 2.41 7 1174 1417 47 0.061 0.073 0.79 0.71
Open Flights 0.64 10.67 594 2939 15677 38 0.144 0.144 0.54 0.32
US Airports 0.35 21.87 2454 1574 17215 11 0.311 0.364 0.06 0.22
Yeast Protein 0.78 2.39 15 1846 2203 179 0.068 0.121 0.59 0.55
H Pylori 0.50 3.88 45 724 1403 25 0.097 0.384 0.45 0.30
C Elegans 0.42 8.94 358 453 2025 9 0.232 0.396 0.37 0.20
TABLE I. Topological data for several networks consisting of average modularity, mean degree, second momentum, size of the
original network, total number of edges, mean number of modules, relative size of the largest community, fraction of edges
linking distinct communities, and relative overall efficiency of MBA method as compared to betweennss-based method for edge
and node attacks.
Nonetheless, this procedure is slower than traditional
methods since fast community extraction takes, depend-
ing on the algorithm used, about O(N2), resulting in a
lower limit of computation of O(N2+N×E) > O(N×E),
where N is the total number of nodes and E stands for
the total number of edges.
As a preemptive measure of our proposed method we
show in Fig. 2 the relation between the fraction of nodes
in the interface of communities, i.e. the fraction of nodes
that make the connection between the different modules
extracted from the networks, and the value of the mod-
ularity for each one of the real networks that we present
in the next section. As expected, we observe an approxi-
mate linear (negative) correlation between the fraction of
edges bridging communities and the modularity Q, which
is precisely the desired feature that makes the method
potentially well posed. As we can see, the infrastructure
networks are the ones which better adjust to the linear
behavior while the social networks are the worst cases.
IV. RESULTS
We now apply the method to real networks with dif-
ferent topological structures. We investigate the behav-
ior of such systems when topological characteristics are
measured only once before the attacking procedure —the
so-called simultaneous attack. Besides, the graphs were
taken as undirected. For the networks studied here, the
different methods for communities extraction, i.e. mul-
tilevel [13], fast greedy [18], walktrap [19], infomap [20],
and leading eigenvector [12], have all a community mem-
bership coincidence higher than 90%. Thence, in these
simulations we have used the method proposed by Blon-
del et al. [13] because it is the quickest in computing
time.
We have chosen three distinct groups of networks: in-
frastructure (US Power Grid, Euro Road, Open Flights
and US Airports) [9, 21–27], biological (Yeast Protein,
C Elegans and H Pylori) [28–31] and social (Facebook,
Google+ and Twitter) [32–35]. In the Euro Road net-
work, nodes represent European cities and edges repre-
sent roads. Power Grid stands for the electrical power
grid of the Western States of the United States of Amer-
ica. An edge represents a power supply line and a node
is either a generator, a transformer, or a substation. The
Yeast Protein interaction network is the same as in [28].
In the metabolic network of the roundworm Caenorhab-
ditis elegans nodes are metabolites (e.g., proteins) and
edges are interactions between them. The Helicobacter
pylori is the same protein-protein interaction map as
in [29]. In the Facebook user-user friendship network
(NIPS) nodes represent users and edges represent friend-
ship. Similarly, in the Google+ network, an edge means
that one user (node) has the other user (node) in her/his
circles, while in the Twitter network an edge indicates
that both users (nodes) follow each other.
Simulations show that vertex MBA always outper-
forms the traditional betweenness attack. Initially, both
methods are similar but, as bridging nodes are deleted,
whole communities start to detach from the core of the
graph, resulting in large atomization of the network and
hence in an abrupt increase of Γ. On the other hand,
in edge MBA the situation changes. As we erase solely
edges bridging modules, initial attacks result in a plateau
in σ until we effectively detach whole modules. After this
critical point is reached, σ decreases abruptly, relatively
large communities are detached extremely fast, and the
whole network falls apart. Attacks usually stop before
σ → 0, depending on the particular modular structure of
each network, at a point Pc = (σc, ρc). This happens pre-
cisely when all original communities are detached with no
targeted node (edge) left in the remaining clusters, so the
network stops functioning as a whole —for instance, in-
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FIG. 3. Vertex MBA applied to real networks. Figure portrays the size of the biggest connected component relative to the
original network’s size, σ, in function of the fraction of removed nodes, ρ. Network data are explained in Table I.
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FIG. 4. Edge MBA applied to real networks. Figure portrays the size of the biggest connected component relative to the
original network’s size, σ, in function of the fraction of removed links, ρ. Network data are explained in Table I.
5formation would be stacked within the communities and
these structures would not be able to communicate each
other. From this point on, one may continue to strike
the network (or what is left of it, which is the remain-
ing largest connected component, generally speaking, of
the same size of the biggest original community) by some
classical attack based on centrality measures such as de-
gree or betweenness. Looking at the figures of the at-
tacks, we can say that vertex MBA shows a second-order
phase transitions type behavior (Fig. 3), while edge MBA
exhibits a typical first-order phase transition behavior
(Fig. 4). In either case, with σ(ρ) as the order parame-
ter, the critical points shown in Figs. 3 and 4 mark what
we call modular percolation, i.e. the point at which the
network is modularly disconnected.
In general, attacking nodes is more efficient than edges
since the removal of a vertex always results in the deletion
of all edges attached to it. However, depending on the
real system studied, vertex or edge attack may not make
sense. For instance, in the case of Euro Road one may
envisage blocking the traffic between two cities, while
removing a node would mean to erase an entire village.
On the other hand, in biological systems for example,
node deletion makes sense, since individual metabolites
are susceptible to be removed from the network.
With these results we now plot the efficiency Γ of the
MBA as compared to CBA as a function of ρ for each net-
work in Fig. 5. It is easy to see that most networks reach
a gain in efficiency of more than 50% for less than 7%
of nodes removed – the more oustanding case being the
US Power Grid with more than 95% of gain with approx-
imately 3% of nodes removed. Even in the worst cases
(Yeast Protein, H pylori and US Airports) we get more
than 60% of gain for less than 16% of vertices deleted.
The overall efficiency of MBA as compared to CBA
may be measured by how fast MBA reaches the modular
critical point relative to CBA. In other words, we can
define the relative overall efficiency as:
η = Γc × %c (2)
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FIG. 5. Gain in efficiency of vertex MBA, compared to vertex
CBA, as a function of the fraction of removed nodes. Network
data are explained in Table I.
where Γc is calculated at the critical point (ρc) and %c is
defined as 1 − ρ/ρnull where ρ stands for the fraction of
nodes removed at the critical σ in the MBA approach and
ρnull is evaluated at the same y-axis point but in the CBA
curve. As before, the reference or null method of attack
is betweenness-based. The results for the present method
of attack on the ten networks, in terms of the previous
defined η, shown in Fig. 7, tells us that its efficiency
strongly depends on the modularity. This is an expected
phenomenon since networks with high modularity tend
to have a density of edges connecting communities much
smaller than the density of internal edges.
FIG. 6. Facebook sub-graph depicting its trivial modular
structure.
However, in the node removal approach, we have a
slightly different picture since the attacks also break
down the internal structures of the modules, departing
from a linear fit. There is also another important effect
that should be noticed: some networks have high mod-
ularity, but the inner structure of the modules is very
weak. In these cases, the MBA approach does not in-
troduce major gains in efficiency, even though it is still
more efficient than traditional CBA. The fact is that in
these systems the inner community structure is weak so
a more simple attack can be as efficient as the one pre-
sented here. On the other side, we may have networks
with smaller modularity, but for which the impact of the
MBA approach is higher than the impact on networks
with higher modularity. That is precisely the special case
of the Facebook network extract studied here. As we can
see from Fig. 6 the community structure of this network
is trivial, with most of the bridging nodes correspond-
ing to the ones with higher degree. Besides, the internal
structures of modules are extremely weak with all nodes
connected only to a few vertices or even to only one cen-
tral node.
Before arriving at the conclusion, we illustrate on the
attack procedure with a case where its performance is
remarkably better than previous and well accepted at-
tacking prescriptions. That example is the Power grid of
Western USA. In this sense, Fig. 8 summarizes the result
60.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Q
η
PGrid
E Road
Y Protein
G +
Twitter
O Flights
H pylori
US Air
C elegans
Facebook
Infrastructure
Biological
Social
(a)
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Q
η
PGrid
Twitter
E Road
G +
Y Protein
O Flights
Facebook
H pylori
C elegans
US Air
Infrastructure
Biological
Social
(b)
FIG. 7. Overall efficiency η of MBA, compared to CBA, as a function of modularity for (a), nodes and (b), edges removal.
FIG. 8. Pictorial comparison between the effect of betweenness-based attack, degree-based attack, longest path attack [36] and
module-based attack in the case of US Power Grid system for 1%, 2% and 3% of nodes removed.
of our method of attack as compared to betweenness cen-
trality attack, degree centrality attack, and longest path-
way attack [36], along with the snapshots of the network
when 1%, 2% and 3% of nodes are removed by between-
ness centrality ranking (CBA) and by the module-based
method (MBA). Remarkably, the present method breaks
the original network of 4941 nodes to many fragments
smaller than 197 nodes (4% of the original size) by re-
moving mere 164 nodes (≈ 3%) identified by the proce-
dure. By comparison, in any degree or centrality based
procedure, deleting the same amount of nodes, removes
only 22% of the original network, i.e. more than 3800
nodes continue to be connected after that. Such extreme
atomization of the network is represented graphically by
7the set of figures on the far right of Fig. 8. Besides, it
is promptly seen that the community structure of this
network is far from trivial.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a module-based attack method
which consists of erasing only those structures that bridge
distinct communities ordered by betweenness centrality.
Computational simulations on many real networks show
that the MBA method is more efficient in atomizing net-
works than traditional procedures based only on central-
ity criteria. Henceforth, one may say that, in general, the
most connected or most central nodes are not necessarily
the most important for the network survival. Conceptu-
ally speaking, nodes (edges) linking distinct communities
are structurally more important and crucial for the mod-
ular cohesion of the network than nodes (edges) with
high degree or centrality indexes. Obviously, networks
with high modularity tend to be in general more fragile
against module-based attacks, while networks with intra-
module weakness can show smaller differences between
different attacking methods.
It should be noted that, regarding the aim of the
present work, the communities that emerge from the net-
works by using the module identification algorithms, have
in principle no relation with real communities. However,
the organization of a network in coarse grain agglomera-
tion may disclose important information about the struc-
tural functionality of complex networks.
In discussions of community detection algorithm, the
resolution limit is a topic of debate, however in connec-
tion with the attack method proposed here, it is not
highly relevant. In fact, what is desirable is a compro-
mise solution in terms of the average module size and
the network size. Large modules means a network de-
composed in few of them, which is good because many
nodes are disconnected once a module is detached from
the others. The drawback is that the last module could
be still a large part of the original network. On the other
hand, a decomposition in many small communities has
the advantage of ending with a highly fragmented net-
work, but at the expense of being slower than the other
scenario. Therefore the optimum is a situation somehow
in the middle, and that is the reason the resolution limit
of communities is not of high concern here.
As a final remark, we emphasize that eventual applica-
tions of module-based attacks to classes of real systems
such as terror, crime or disease related networks might
lead to groundbreaking procedures to fight these un-
wanted threats. We acknowledge CNPq and the Brazil-
ian Federal Police for financial support.
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